《JAPAN AND CHINA IN POLISH DIPLOMACY, 1918-1939》文摘

 In 1931, the position adopted by Poland as a non-permanent member of the Council of the League of Nations was related to the search for new paths in Polish policy in conséquence of the graduai process of breakdown in the Versailles system. The establishing of diplomatie relations with China precisely at this time was also not without its effect. The relations were thus characterized by ambivalence. Like the western powers, Poland attempted to adopt a critical stance in respect of the aggressor, but on the other hand did not want to alienate Japan. Instructions from the Minister of Foreign Affäirs, August Zaleski, to Franciszek Sokal, the Republic’s delegate to the Council of the League of Nations, enjoined him, in voting on the numerous resolutions and proposais condemning Japan, to vote for them in cases where the entire Council voted for them, and against them if votes in the Council were divided. Zaleski’s speech at the Council’s session in September, 1931 was unclear. The minister concentrated on the question of the need to respect the right to territorial integrity and political independence, which can be takén as condemnation of the aggression. At the same time, however, he bowed in Japan’s direction when he stated that he welcomed the Japanese delegation’s déclaration that Japan did not intend to violate fundamental obligations, despite the considérable vagueness of the Japanese formulation. Moreover, the speech contained hints of criticism directed at the League of Nations. It was claimed that it had not created mechanisms which would have permitted it to operate efficiently.11 Sokal clearly described the motives behind Poland’s position in his report of 30 October, 1931. In it he wrote of the multi-faceted concern in the conflict in view of the Polish interests in Manchuria, relations with the USSR, who were becoming more disposed to finalizing the negotiations on a non-aggression pact with Poland, and of possible parallels in a case where the Council were to examine a conflict in which the opposing sides were Germany and Poland. 12 We should remember that this was a period of great tension in Polish-German relations and—leaving aside 1939—the apogee of revisionist activity. It would seem thät regard for Germany was vital. It spoke in favour of respecting the principle of territorial integrity and inviolability of the status quo, and at the same time spoke in favour of maintaining good relations with Japan, and the more so that Germany was attempting to use the affair in order to deepen Japanese-German friendship, and to discount the Japanese aggression for her own revisionist purposes. The German ambassador in Tokyo was to suggest that Poland, together with France, was influencing the increasing severity of the League’s resolutions in an anti-Japanese respect, which did not fit in with the facts, and to recommend that the Japanese delegation should establish a link between Poland’s position in the Council and Japan’s position in the League’s minorities section.18 These considérations brought about a situation where Poland could not exploit the opportunity to demonstrate the great significance it attached to the principle of respecting the territorial clauses of the treaties, and to energetic action on the part of the League of Nations. It was assumed that such démonstration would not be of any gain to Poland, since she would not be in a position to press the Council for effective action. On the other hand it would offend Japan, which might redound to Poland’s disadvantage in her position in the inévitable—as was correctly anticipated—Polish-German conflict. Voices unequivocally condemning the aggression, and pointing to its potentiaily dangerous implications, could, however, be heard on the left and in liberal circles.